



# Mind the SIM: Awareness and Mental Models in a South Korean Case Study

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

Background: The SIM may be a tiny chip, but it is a critical security backbone



## SIM (Subscriber Identity Module)

1. Identity
  - Identifies you on the network
  - Links phone number to device
2. Authentication
  - Stores secure credentials
  - Enables OTP verification
3. Connectivity
  - Connects to mobile network
  - Enables communication

# SIM CARD CONNECTS:



IDENTITY




DEVICE




SERVICES (Bank, Apps)

# Background: What happens when the SIM is compromised?

## SIM Swapping



NO SERVICE



MOBILE CARRIER

## Motivation: SKT SIM Data Breach (2025)




# SK Telecom users' USIM data leaked in cyberattack

- South Korea's largest telecom provider, SK Telecom (SKT), was breached
- Exposure of SIM authentication data affecting ~23 million users (~50% of the population)
- Leaked data included SIM identifiers (IMSI) and authentication keys (Ki)
- Carrier response: SIM replacement and additional security measures

# BUT HOW DO USERS ACTUALLY MAKE SENSE OF THIS?

Large-scale breach  
Critical security risk



Do users understand what was exposed?

Do they realize the risks?

Do they take action?

**A highly visible breach, rooted in an invisible infrastructure**

# Motivation: The missing piece – User Mental Model

## Technical SIM Security

- SIM vulnerabilities
- Weak authentication mechanisms
- SMS-based authentication risks

User understanding of SIM security

## User Perception & Behavior

- Awareness of security incidents
- Perceived risks and concerns
- Behavioral responses

**SIM operates as a “black box” for users**

# Research Questions

Understand how users perceive, interpret, and respond to SIM security incidents

RQ1: **[Awareness]** How do users perceive the SKT SIM authentication key breach and understand the associated risks and impacts?

RQ2: **[Response]** How do users respond emotionally and behaviorally to the SIM security incident, and how do these responses differ between directly affected and unaffected individuals?

RQ3: **[Mental Model]** How do users conceptualize the operation of SIM cards and SIM-based authentication in everyday smartphone use?

# Research Overview



## Participants

- N = 33
- SKT / non-SKT
- Age: 20s-60s



## Method

- Semi-structured interviews
- Drawing task
- Post-session reflection




## Analysis

- Thematic analysis
- Mental models:  
Low / Mid / High

# Participant Details



- N = 33 participants
- Carriers: SKT (17), non-SKT (16)
- Age: 20s-60+
- SIM replacement (SKT users): 9 / 17



## Demographics

- Gender-balanced
- Diverse education levels

## Technology background

- Mostly non-CS
- Few with IT/security experience

## Devices & SIM

- Android & iOS mix
- Physical SIM + eSIM

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RQ3: [**Mental Model**] How do users conceptualize the operation of SIM cards and SIM-based authentication in everyday smartphone use?

## Results (RQ1-1): Users lack understanding, but perceive risks

### Understanding

- “SIM ”= just a hack
- Unaware of SIM functions
- Could not explain what was exposed

### Risk Perception

- Financial loss
- Identity theft
- Personal / work / family risks


Risks are interpreted through familiar frames, not SIM understanding

## Results (RQ1-1): Users lack understanding, but perceive risks



“If whatever the thing called *SIM* gets hacked, somebody’s going to **take my money away**.” – P9 (SKT)

“Smartphones are basically your **identity card** across apps... If that gets stolen? I don’t even want to think about it.” – P13 (non-SKT)



“What if my hacked phone reaches out to **my kids**?” – P22 (non-SKT)

# Results (RQ1-2): Perceived risk does not lead to high concerns



Helplessness



Trust



Safety Insensitivity



Low data value



Limited Understanding

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## Results (RQ2-1): Trust varies, but personal relevance remains low



Low Trust

“I don’t know if just changing the SIM is really a solution. This wasn’t some outside attack. It was a **backdoor inside the system.**” – P12 (SKT)

“This didn’t happen because something was wrong with my SIM. It happened because **the company failed to manage SIMs properly.**” – P16 (non-SKT)



High Trust

“I trust them a lot. **They’re a big company.** They give more data and discounts because of the accident.” – P21 (SKT)

“I’d feel safer with the **physical SIM replacement.** At least I can see it being done.” – P27 (non-SKT)

# Results (RQ2-1): Trust varies, but personal relevance remains low

## Affected users (SKT)

- Detached response
- “Not me” perspective
- Incident normalized

*“When I first received the message that my data was breached, I thought, ‘Oh, okay.’ It happens all the time to everyone, and I’m not the one hackers would target.” - P2 (SKT)*

## Non-affected users (non-SKT)

- Mixed attachment & detachment
- Often redirected to others (e.g., family)

*“I use LG U+, so at first I didn’t pay much attention to the news. **But my mom uses SKT, so I felt like I had to do something.**” - P10 (non-SKT)*


## Results (RQ2-2): Users take action, but rarely take initiative

Full compliance  
(SIM replacement) (N=9)

Partial compliance  
(service only) (N=2)

No action (N=5)

Self-initiated behavior  
(rare)



- Driven by cost, effort, convenience
- Fatigue / indifference
- Lack of visible threat
- Follow carrier guidance

# Research Questions

Understand how users perceive, interpret, and respond to SIM security incidents


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## Results (RQ3-1): People know SIM matters, but don't understand it

*“It’s necessary to activate a mobile phone. I don’t really know what information it contains, but I assume it must include some personal information, since it’s required for phone activation.” – P19 (non-SKT)*



Moderate understanding (N = 17)   Low comprehension (N = 9)   Accurate model (N = 7)

# Results (RQ3-2): Diverse mental models of SIMs in practice

## Call process



### High-Level Understanding (N = 6)

*“The signal is delivered to the telecom operator via SIM, then passed through the base station and finally to the recipient's phone.”* – P1 (SKT)



### Mid-Level Understanding (N = 18)

*“I don't think any other information is transmitted. Probably just the voice signal.”* – P10 (non-SKT)



### Low-Level Understanding (N = 9)

*“The SIM in my ear absorbs the signals and delivers them to the brain. That way we communicate.”* – P21 (SKT)


# Results (RQ3-2): Diverse mental models of SIMs in practice

## Call process



### High-Level Understanding (N = 6)

*"The signal is delivered to the telecom operator via SIM, then passed through the telecom operator's network to the recipient's phone."* - P1 (SKT)



(a) High level (P1)

(b) Medium level (P10)

(c) Low level (P21)



### Low-Level Understanding (N = 9)

*"The SIM in my ear absorbs the signals and delivers them to the brain. That way we communicate."* - P21 (SKT)

# Results (RQ3-2): Diverse mental models of SIMs in practice

## Authentication



### High-Level Understanding (N = 6)

*“I submit my info to the bank, and then they rely on the mobile carrier to send me a one-time code through SMS. That code isn’t generated by the bank itself but delivered via my SIM, so when I enter it back, the bank can verify both my identity and that I have access to my registered phone.” – P29 (non-SKT)*



### Mid-Level Understanding (N = 16)

*“I think there’s a department at a bank fully dedicated to authentication. . . they issue and verify the code.” – P2 (SKT)*



### Low-Level Understanding (N = 11)


*“This is authentication done on the site, so it is possible without a SIM” – P26 (non-SKT)*

# Results (RQ3-2): Diverse mental models of SIMs in practice

## 🔑 Authentication

SIM! 📱

### High-Level Understanding (N = 6)



(a) High level (P29)



(b) Medium level (P2)

PASS



(c) Low level (P26)



*"This is authentication done on the site, so it is possible without a SIM" - P26 (non-SKT)*

# Results (RQ3-3): Understanding SIM security without behavioral change

Upon seeing instruction video on SIM functionality...



## Learning (Understanding)

What changed?

- 20 / 33 learned new information
- Misconceptions corrected
- Risk perceived as more serious



## Action (Behavior)

What didn't change?

- 8 / 20 → no intention to act
- Limited behavior change overall
- Responsibility shifted to carriers

**Learning ↑ ≠ Action ↑**

# Discussion: Phone Number as Digital Identity, but Limited Protection Awareness

## Finding



- Phone number = **digital identity** (banking, authentication)
- Users aware of **financial / identity risks**

### **BUT**

- “SIM = just hacked”
- **Shallow understanding**
- **Low personal action**

Low personal relevance, Reliance on carriers, Limited action

# Discussion: Connect identity use to concrete security risks

## Implication



#1. Focus on **specific knowledge gaps** and **real-world relevance** for education

#2. Use **everyday scenarios** (banking, messaging, OTP)


#3. Reflective framing + just-in-time nudges

#4. Cultural and social context adaptation

Explain SIM in ways that connect directly to everyday risks

# Discussion: SIM as invisible infrastructure, default trust

## Finding



Invisible systems lead to passive trust, not active protection

# Discussion: Perceptible security touchpoints

## Implication



- #1. Make security perceptible at **key interaction moments**, not continuously
- #2. Support **functional understanding**, not technical transparency
- #3. **Surface invisible authentication events** to recalibrate user expectations

Make invisible authentication processes perceptible at the moment they happen

## Mind the SIM: Key Takeaways

- **Awareness ≠ Action**  
→ Users recognize risk, but rarely act
- **Shallow mental models**  
→ SIM = “black box”, misunderstood or invisible
- **Perceived low personal relevance**  
→ “Not me”, reliance on carriers
- **Invisible security → passive behavior**  
→ “Phone works = safe” illusion

Make invisible security perceptible at the right moments



# Mind the SIM: Awareness and Mental Models in a South Korean Case Study

Paper

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